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Abstract Open access in the U.S. fishery for American lobsters has created
seasonally concentrated landings. This analysis examines the impact of sea-
sonality upon the market and also analyzes the possible tise of seasonal clo-
sures to counteract this seasonality. Monthly price response functions are
estimated using principal components regression. A linear programming
model, which uses the monthly price response eqttations.jinds that the gross
revenue maximizing pattern of U.S. landings would increase U.S. revenues by
18 percent. Ftirthermore, the increased concentration of U.S. landings that
has occurred between the 1960s and 1980s has decreased revenues to U.S.
fishermen hy an estimated 6 percent. We,find that one or two month closures
wilt not increase gross revenues. Closures for extended periods (such as Au-
gust to November) might increase gross revenues modestly, but such extended
closures face serious political obstacles. Because this is an open access fish-
ery, resource rents will not be generated from any increase in revenues. Higher
revenues would seem to be consistent with other political objectives, such as
increasing economic activity in fishing communities.
Keywords Lobster demand, seasonal closures, fishery management.
Introduction
The landings of American lobsters in the U.S. have a distinct seasonal pattern,
with very high landings in the July to November period. This concentration occurs
because the high level of fishing effort generated by open access causes most
lobsters to be landed immediately after the lobsters molt to the minimum legal
size. The increasing levels of fishing effort have caused this seasonal pattern to
become ever more concentrated over time.
This seasonal pattern of landings depresses prices in summer, when landings
are greatest. The effects of higher summer landings are exacerbated by lower
quality due to "soft shells" of post-molt lobsters. Prices in the winter, when
supplies are low, are much higher.
The present analysis uses estimated monthly price response equations to as-
sess the impact of this seasonal pattern upon the gross revenue earned by the U.S.
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Figure 1. U.S. Landings and Imports of Live American Lobster.
1988
industry. The analysis also examines whether seasonal closures might be used to
reduce the concentration of landings and thus increase total revenues.
Description of the Industry
The American lobster (Hotnarus amerkanus) is harvested on the continental shelf
and the continental margin of the northwest Atlantic Ocean. The lobster fishery is
one of the most valuable fisheries in the coastal New England states and in the
Canadian Maritime Provinces. The most important market for American lobsters
is the live market, which is predominantly in the U.S. In the period 1986-88, the
U.S. landed, on average, 46 million pounds of lobsters with an ex-vessel value of
$129 million, and Canada exported to the U.S. about 31 million pounds of live
lobsters valued at $102 million {1988 U.S. dollars). Total supply of lobsters to the
U.S. market from 1981 to 1988 is presented in Figure 1. Note that there has been
an increasing trend in supply from both countries.
The primary regulatory measures for lobsters in the U.S. are minimum size
restrictions. Lobster size is determined by the length of the carapace, and mini-
mum carapace lengths are legislated in all producing areas. For most of the study
period, the minimum size in most U.S. producing areas was 3 3/16 inches.' The
' The minimum size in New Hampshire and New Jersey was 3 1/8 inches during this period.
The U.S. raised its minimum carapace to 3 7/32 inches in 1988 and to 3 1/4 inches in 1989.
Scheduled increases in the carapace length for 1991 and 1992 have been suspended and are









Figure 2. Monthly U.S. Landings Plus Imports of American Lobster (1986-1988 average).
minimum size in the Canadian regions that produce primarily for the U.S. live
market was also 3 3/16."
The supply of lobsters is highly seasonal. In the U.S., this seasonality is
determined by the molting cycle; in Canada, closed seasons determine the land-
ings pattern. Lobsters near the minimum legal carapace size typically molt once
per year. When this molt occurs, a new "crop" of legal lobsters is recruited to the
fishery. In the U.S., over 80 percent of the catch each year is obtained from
lobsters that have been recruited to the fishery in the previous molt (Thomas
1973). Landings from the U.S. are heavily concentrated in July through Novem-
ber, immediately following the summer molt period (see Figure 2).
The Canadian fishery has regulated seasons, and most lobsters for export to
the U.S. are caught in a spring season (May-June) and in a winter season that
begins in December. The seasonality of Canadian exports to the U.S. is also
affected by pounding activity. Pounds are large enclosed saltwater pools that hold
live lobsters. Pound operators in both the U.S. and Canada purchase lobsters
when landings are high (and prices are low) and sell them when landings are low
(and prices are high). Lobsters are pounded in May and sold in June or July and
pounded again in very late August through early December and sold in late winter.
(These dates vary slightly from year to year and depend upon a number of factors,
^ Canada also has regions, mostly in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, that are permitted to harvest
lobsters with minimum carapace lengths as low as 2.5 inches. Those small lobsters are used
primarily for processed products, such as frozen and canned lobsters.104 Cheng and Townsend
including the dates of Canadian seasons, weather-related supply patterns, and
prices. See Casey [1992] and Richardson [1992] for a more detailed discussion.)
Figure 2 presents average U.S. production and total supply by month for 1986-
1988.
Estimation of Seasonal Price Response
If supply is assumed to be exogenous, an inverse demand equation with the
ex-vessel price (Pj) as a function of monthly quantity (Q^) can be specified and
estimated. As discussed in Townsend (1986), total U.S. landings have been ex-
tremely stable. Moreover, the molting cycle determines the monthly distribution
of these landings in the U.S. Thus, monthly U.S. landings are essentially exoge-
nous.
While seasonality of Canadian landings is determined by seasonal closures,
Canadian exports are influenced by pounding. Although pounding activity does
have a very regular annual cycle, the exact timing of pounding activity is respon-
sive to prices. The presence of pounded lobsters in the supply data weakens the
case for the exogenous supply assumption of the present model. Ideally, a model
would incorporate pounding activity as an inventory activity. Unfortunately, no
data were available on purchases by pounds or sales from pounds in either the
U.S. or Canada, so a more sophisticated model cannot be constructed.^
The price equation also included monthly U.S. personal disposable income
(Y|). Demand is seasonal, in large part, because of the significant summer tourist
market for lobsters. The price equation is also affected by quality differences due
to the relative mix of soft- and hard-shell lobsters. Hard-shells are considered
higher quality. Landings immediately after the molt cycle (which runs from sum-
mer into early fall) have a relatively high percentage of soft-shells. The model was
made monthly by the inclusion of eleven binary intercept shifters and eleven slope
shifters. The base month is December, when all binary variables are identically
zero. The resulting (linear) price response model is":
Pi = ao + ai Qi + a2 Yi + 2 (bj Dij + cj Dij Qi) + e; (1)
' The alternative of using Canadian landings rather than Canadian exports to the U.S. also
has serious problems. Of all Canadian lobsters, only 57 percent are sold to U.S. live
markets (Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1989). Canadian landings include
a large percent of lobsters that are too small for the U.S. live market. Because of these very
significant differences, it is preferable to accept the limitations of including pounded lob-
sters in the supply of live lobsters from Canada. The data available from Casey (1992) and
Richardson (1992) are essentially an estimate of the average pounding pattern. These two
sources do not provide actual annual variations in pounding activity that could be used to
estimate pound operator response to price changes.
" The choice of a linear function is determined primarily by the nature of the optimization
task to which the estimates are applied. The most obvious demand function, a double-log
function with constant elasticity, can result in prices that are unrealistically high outside the
range of the actual data. This occurs because the demand function asymptotically ap-
proaches the y-axis as quantity approaches zero. The result can be (and was in our initial
work) implausible optimal seasonal distributions.Lobster Seasonal Closures 105
where Dj , = 1 if January: 0 otherwise; Dj, = 1 if February; 0 otherwise; and
similarly for Djj through Dj,,; a^, bj. and Cj are parameters to be estimated; and
e; is a stochastic error ~ N(O,v^).
For each of the demand curves to be downward sloping, we would expect for
January through November (j equal to I through 11):
a, + bj > 0
and a, + Cj < 0.
For December's demand function to be downward sloping, we would expect:
and a, < 0.
Finally, if lobster is a normal good, then we would expect income to have a
positive impact upon price:
Wang and Kellogg (1988) have previously estimated a two-equation system for
wholesale and ex-vessel prices that included seasonal effects. That analysis in-
cluded three seasons: summer, winter, and spring/fall. For the purpose of specif-
ically analyzing the impact of various seasonal aspects, the twelve monthly de-
mand equations of the present analysis will permit more refined analysis. If the
demand equations in any group of months {i.e.. a "season") are constrained to be
identical, then an optimization of the monthly landings pattern will yield identical
sales in all months within that season. We did not want to impose this constraint
on the optimization. (Note that if the parameters for some set of months are
identical, then the expected value of the unconstrained estimates have the same
expected value, even if the equality constraint Is not imposed.)
Equation (I) was initially estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). That
estimation indicated the existence of severe multicollinearity among the regres-
sors. The principal component regression method was adopted in this study to
reduce multicollinearity.^ Principal component regression extracts the principal
components of variability from correlated explanatory variables and then uses this
information to reduce the dimensionality of the estimation.
Data
Data from January 1981 to December 1988 were used to estimate the price re-
sponse model. For a small percent of the data, interpolation of monthly data from
annual data was necessary. All quantities were measured in millions of pounds.
Monthly U.S. landings data for Maine, Rhode Island, off-shore Massachusetts,
New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia were obtained from special re-
' See Judge et o/. (1985). pp. 909-%2 for a general discussion of principal components
regression. Note that principal components regression generally results in biased esti-
mates, but the estimates may have lower mean square erTor (cf. Fomby and Hill 1978).J06 Cheng and Townsend
ports from the Office of Data and Information Management, National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, USA. Data for Con-
necticut from 1986-1988 were obtained from the same source. Data for Connect-
icut for 1981-1985 were obtained by request from Marine Fisheries Division,
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, in Waterford, Connecti-
cut, USA. Massachusetts in-shore landings were derived from Massachusetts
Lobster Fishery Statistics (1981 to 1988 issues), which are published annually by
the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries.^
The above data provided monthly U.S. landings for all jurisdictions except
New Hampshire and Delaware. Total annual landings for those two states were
available from NMFS. Estimates of New Hampshire and Delaware monthly land-
ings were derived by applying the landings distribution for all other states to the
annual landings for the two missing states. Both states have relatively small land-
ings: New Hampshire landings averaged 1.124 million pounds or 2.5 percent of
total landings in the period 1986-1988; Delaware's landings averaged .085 million
pounds or .2 percent of total landings. The assumption that the landings pattern
follows the overall pattern is very reasonable for New Hampshire, and Delaware's
landings are trivial. The interpolation should not create significant data problems.
Monthly imports of live lobsters from Canada were provided by the National
Fishery Statistics Program. National Marine Fisheries Service in Washington,
D.C. All live lobster imports come from Canada. As noted above, import data
reflect both sales of newly landed lobsters in Canada and sales from pounds.
Ex-vessel Maine price in 1988 U.S. dollars was derived from value of sales and
quantity data from NMFS. Real monthly U.S. personal disposable income, mea-
sured in billions of real 1982 U.S. dollars, was obtained from the Survey of Cur-
rent Business. Price and sales data were converted to real data with a base year
1988 using the Implicit Price Index (1982 = 100) for Personal Consumption Ex-
penditures from the Survey of Current Business.
Results
Equation (I) was estimated by principal components regression, and estimates for
the parameters are presented in Table 17 In the estimation, the 24 variables were
reduced to 12 components. (For that reason, the degrees of freedom in the F-test
is 12.) Because the a priori hypotheses about the demand parameters were in
terms of the demand equation for each of twelve months, it is easiest to interpret
* The definitions of "inshore" and "offshore" in the Federal and Massachusetts data sets
are not identical. The Federal reports use an inside three miles/outside three miles defini-
tioji. Massachusetts classifies by geodetic coordinates: landings north of 4rN and west of
69°W are classified as inshore. Massachusetts actually reports a percentage distribution by
month. We applied the reported percentage to the Federal annual lobster catch data for
inshore Massachusetts, which was derived by subtracting offshore landings from total
annual Massachusetts landings. The result would vary slightly from the reported data by
Massachusetts.
•^ Estimation was performed using the SHAZAM, Version 6.2 for IBM-compatible personal
computers. Principal components with the largest characteristic roots were retained. The
use of 12 principal components resulted in the highest corrected R^ (cf. Sanint 1982). The
components are not of direct interest, so they are not reported here. They are, of course
available from the authors.Lobster Seasonal Closures
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R^ = 0.8019 Adjusted
F,2 83 = 28.00.
Dufbin-Watson = .987.
- .7733.
those parameters when restated as monthly price response functions, as presented
in Table 2. All monthly parameters have the hypothesized signs, and are statis-
tically significant at the one percent level. (The critical value for t83 equals 2.75.)
Thus, all the estimated monthly demand curves are downward sloping. Price
flexibilities were computed at mean values for 1986-1988 and are presented in
Table 2.^ The estimated price flexibilities by month are somewhat larger than
those reported by Wang and Kellogg (1988), but they exhibit very similar seasonal
patterns. Note that the results of Wang and Kellogg (1988) are not strictly com-
parable, because they included seasonal effects in wholesale prices, while our
analysis was ex-vessel.
* Intuitively, price flexibilities are the reciprocals of price elasticities. However, the cal-
culation of price elasticities from estimated price flexibilities will produce biased estimates
(Houck 1965).108 Cheng and Townsend
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* t-ratlos in parentheses below parameter estimates.
® Estimated at mean landings for 1986-1988.
Income effects on ex-vessel price are positive, as hypothesized a priori, and
statistically significant from zero. The model explains 80 percent of the variation
in real monthly price.*
An F-test was constructed to test the hypothesis that all of the monthly price
response equations are identical. This is implemented by testing if the coefficients
of both the intercept and slope shifters are identically zero:
HQ: b| = b2 = . . . = bii ^ Cl = C2 = . . . = Cii = 0
H^: HQ is false
* The Durbin-Watson test-statistic for autocorrelation (.987) indicates the presence of first-
order autocorrelation. We have been unable to identify any estimator that corrects for
autocorrelation within principal components. This is undoubtedly because principal com-
ponents is known to produce biased results, so an estimator that corrects for autocorre-
lation within the principal components will still be biased. Thus we have not attempted to
eliminate the autocorrelation. Note that autocorrelation does not generally result in biased
estimates, although the variance estimates are biased and the estimates are inefTicient.
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Figure 3. Predicted Price.
The F,o«3 equals 9.19, which exceeds the critical I percent value of 2.54.'*' The
hypothesis that the twelve monthly price response equations are identical is re-
jected.
Because principal components is known to produce estimates that have bias of
some unknown degree, it is desirable to provide some assessment of the esti-
mated parameters. To provide that assessment, data from 1989-1990 were used to
determine the out-of-sample predictions of the model." Figure 3 presents both the
actual data and the predicted data for both the in-sample and out-of-sample pe-
riod. The out-of-sample prediction is very close for 1989, and over-predicts prices
slightly for 1990. The root mean square error for 1981-1988 is .32 and for 1989-90
is .52. The Theil U-statistic for 1981-1988 is .10 and for 1989-90 is .18. In general,
the predictive performance of the model is quite good.
'" The degrees of freedom for the numerator in the F-test is equal to the number of principal
components used in the estimation of the unrestricted equation, 12, less the number of
explanatory variables in the restricted equation, 2.
Because the principal components regression yielded estimates with very similar inter-
cepts for all twelve months, we conducted a test in the original OLS equation to examine
if these intercept shifters might be identically zero. We rejected that hypothesis (F,,.83 =
2.(^; critical value at 5 percent = 1.95). We also tested a set of restrictions that would have
imposed seasons {e.g.. January to March as winter) on the model, and we rejected the
hypothesis that demand equations were the same within these seasons.
" We did not use the 1989-90 data in the initial estimation for three reasons. First, we
completed most of this work prior to the availability of some of this data. Second, two
regulatory changes are widely regarded as dramatically affecting the market after 1988: (I)
the change in the minimum gauge under the New England Fishery Management Council's
Lobster Fishery Management Plan in 1988, and (2) the "Mitchell Bill", which banned the
import of lobsters below the Council's minimum gauge. Third, the State of Massachusetts
made a change in its inshore/offshore defmition in 1989, so the data series is not exactly
comparable after 1988.110 Cheng and Townsend
Impact of Seasonal Landings Patterns upon Industry Revenues
The estimated price response functions were used to assess the impact of changes
in the landings pattern. Total revenue generated by the current monthly distribu-
tion of landings was compared with the total revenue under alternative distribu-
tions. The analysis was addressed to two specific questions. First, what distribu-
tion of landings would generate the highest total revenue for the U.S. industry,
and what would be the increase in total revenue under that scenario? Second,
what has been the impact of the increasing concentration of landings (over the
past 20 years) into the months following the molt?
Note that the analysis is in terms of total revenues rather than resource rents.
Because this is an open access resource, resource rents will be driven to zero by
entry, whether or not seasonal closures are in effect. If limited entry were also
imposed on this fishery, then the analysis should consider the differences in
fishing costs over the year. The objective of increasing total revenues does seem
consistent with various political objectives, such as increasing economic activity
in fishing communities. An increase in total revenue probably also increases pro-
ducer surplus (i.e.. quasi-rents earned by fishermen and their suppliers).
The analysis used average annual and monthly landings for the period 1986 to
1988. As Figure I illustrated, there was an increasing trend in supply in the 1980s,
so more recent data provides the most accurate reflection of the current situation.
The annual supply of lobsters to the U.S. market for 1986-1988 averaged about 77
million pounds with an estimated value of $231 million (in 1988 U.S. dollars) to the
lobster industry in the U.S. and Canada. Of this amount, $129 million went to the
U.S. industry and $102 million to Canada. Average monthly U.S. landings and
total supply and revenues are presented in Table 3.
Table 3













































































$231,099Lobster Seasonal Closures III
To estimate the impact of alternative landings patterns upon the total industry
revenue, total revenue (TR*) was computed as the sum of twelve monthly reve-
nues (TRj). Each monthly revenue is the product of quantity and the monthly
price (which was determined by the price response parameters in Table 2.)
12 12 12
TR* = 2 TRj = 2 Qi Pj = S Qj(ao + bj + [a, + Cj] Qj + a2 Y) (2)
Income was set at mean real income for 1988, so that the trend in real income
would not affect the resuhs. All of the impact analysis applied this convention.
Note that b|2 and C|2 are introduced only for notationa! convenience, and both are
zero.
The first question examined how the current distribution of U.S. landings
compares to the gross revenue maximizing distribution. A linear programming
model maximized total U.S. revenue subject to two sets of constraints:
i.) Canadian exports in each month were equal to average Canadian exports in
that month for 1986-1988.
ii.) The sum of U.S. landings for twelve months equalled the average U.S. total
landings for 1986-1988. 46.4 million pounds. Also, a constraint required U.S.
landings to be non-negative in each month.'"^
Under these constraints, the revenue-maximizing set of U.S. landings would
produce total value of landings of $248 million, with $152 million going to the U.S.
and $96 million going to Canada. These would represent increases of 7 percent in
total value and 18 percent in U.S. value. Value of Canadian exports would fall
because increased sales of U.S. lobsters during the traditional periods of high
Canadian exports depress prices in those months. Table 4 presents the current
monthly distribution of U.S. landings (column 1) and the distribution that pro-
duces maximum revenues (column 2). The same results are presented graphically
in Figure 4.
The second question addressed the increasing concentration of U.S. landings
in the four months following the molt. This increasing concentration was caused
by the increase in the level of fishing effort. The number of traps fished in this
fishery has increased from 947 thousand in 1966 to 2.44 million in 1987.'^ This
increase in fishing effort has caused more of the lobsters to be caught in the first
few months after the molt, which begins in the summer. Figure 5 shows the
three-year average landings distribution in monthly percentages for 1966-1968,
'^ While the U.S. could (and does) purchase lobsters for pounding in months of large
Canadian production, this analysis assumes that the pattern of pounding is fixed. There-
fore, the non-negative constraint is consistent with the assumptions used in estimation.
'^ Data for 1966 from Fisheries Statistics of the U.S., U.S. Department of Commerce.
Preliminary and unotficial data for 1987 provided by the Office of Data and Information
Management, NMFS, Woods Hole, MA.
Increases in traps may understate the increase in fishing effort because of improve-
ments in other gear. Conversely, as each fisherman uses more traps, the marginal produc-
tivity of traps may fall. On net, the trap increases probably reflect fishing effort fairly well.Cheng and Townsend
Table 4
Monthly Distribution of Lobster Supply to the U.S.


























































Total 100^0 100.0 100.0
® The data for 1966-68 are for Maine, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island.
1976-78 and 1986-1988."^ Had the 46.4 million pounds (average for 1986-1988)
been distributed in the same monthly pattern as occurred in 1966-1968, total
revenues would have increased to $137 million, an increase of $8.6 million or 6
percent. Increasing concentration of landings has reduced the total value of land-
ings for the U.S. industry.
The assumption of exogenous lobster supply is not strictly true. The landings
of lobsters are determined primarily by the molt cycle in the U.S. and the regu-
lated seasons in Canada. But for those months where pounding results in either
significant purchases by Canadian pounds or significant sales from Canadian
pounds, the exogeneity assumption has limitations with respect to Canadian ex-
ports. Whiie we lack the data to directly address this problem, we can make
qualitative assessments of how this data problem might affect our results. The
exogeneity assumption for pounding would be equivalent to assuming that the
seasonal pattern of pounding is fixed and invariant to prices. Thus, the bias can be
qualitatively assessed by asking how pound operators' activities will in fact re-
spond to differences in price.
We have identified one key result: The revenue maximizing pattern of monthly
landings would be more equal than the current pattern, and the prices would also
be more equal. But the bias in our estimates is likely to overestimate the benefits
of a more equal landings pattern. As prices become more equal, the incentives for
pounding activity (which profits from the low fall prices and high winter prices)
'" The distributions for 1966-68 and 1976-78 are based upon the landings of Maine, Rhode
Island, and Massachusetts. Data for other states are not available by month for these
earlier periods. The data for these three areas track the overall distribution very closely in
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Figure 4. Estimated Revenue-Maximizing U.S. Lobster Landing Distribution.
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Figure 5. Changing U.S. Lobster Landing Patterns.114 Cheng and Townsend
will be reduced. An endogenous reduction in pounding activity by Canadian
pounds will partially offset any landings changes and hence will tend to counteract
the price changes that make more equal monthly landings desirable.
Management Options
Finally, we turn to the question of whether management might reverse the reve-
nue losses for the lobster industry. Most obviously, reductions in fishing effort
would reverse the concentration of landings. The need for effort reductions in this
fishery has been examined in a number of previous analyses. For example. Smith
(1980) concluded that "stochastic maximum economic yield" occurs at about
200,000 traps, a reduction of 90 percent from current levels. Townsend (1986)
agreed that the marginal product of fishing effort is probably near zero, although
he argued that a Schaefer curve analysis cannot provide a meaningful estimate of
the optimum level of fishing effort. Gates and Richardson (1986) developed a
simulation model that utilized a yield per recruit analysis under the assumption of
constant recruitment. They found significant benefits for both producers and con-
sumers under management policies that reduce effort. Because the Smith (1980)
analysis used annual data and the Gates and Richardson (1986) analysis assumed
a fixed seasonal landings pattern, those analyses did not include any benefits from
a more favorable seasonal distribution of landings. Therefore, those analyses may
even understate the benefits of reducing effort. Although the present analysis
identified another set of losses associated with open access for the lobster fishery,
the estimates cannot by themselves identify an optimal level of fishing effort.
Significant effort reductions in the lobster fishery through limited entry or trap
limits have, at best, only a very slight chance of enactment in the foreseeable
future. Il is therefore useful to consider second-best strategies that might produce
more favorable seasonal landing patterns.
The most obvious possibility is the use of regional closures during the current
periods of high landings. For example, one might consider dividing the producing
area into two or three regions, and having each region closed on a rotating basis.
The price response equations were used to examine a number of variations upon
this theme, including various combinations of closures in August through Decem-
ber.
We simulated the effect of various types of closures by reducing the catch in
some set of summer months and then distributing that reduction in volume over
the balance of the year in proportion to monthly landings. That is, total U.S.
landings and the pattern of Canadian exports were fixed, but the pattern of U.S.
landings was altered. Unfortunately, our results showed that one or two month
regional closures in peak months (August and/or September) increase the value of
landings only by very small amounts. This is because landings increase immedi-
ately after the closures, and seriously depress prices in the late fall (October
through December). From Table 4. it can be seen that the optimal readjustment of
landings requires moving landings from July through December into January
through June. Short closures will not accomplish that effect.
Two scenarios that simulated relatively long seasonal closures did have a
significant impact upon U.S. total revenue. If regional closures could reduce U.S.
landings in the period August to November by 33 percent, U.S. total revenue
would increase $11.3 million, or slightly under 9 percent. If we consider a closureLobster Seasonal Closures 115
involving only Maine (the largest producing state), then a 50 percent reduction in
Maine landings for the period August to November would increase U.S. total
revenues by $9.7 million (about 7 percent) and would increase Maine revenues by
$4.7 million (about 8.5 percent).
This conclusion is rather discouraging from a practical policy point of view.
Seasonal closures would have to be at least four months long to have a significant
impact upon total revenues. Even with relatively long closures, the impact on
total revenue is modest, under 10 percent. While closures of one or two months
are within the realm of political possibility, closures of wide geographic regions
for four months would seem politically unrealistic. Moreover, because shorter
closures have almost no impact, a political strategy of advocating a short closure
to demonstrate the benefits of seasonal closures will not work. Recall that we
concluded in the previous section that our estimates may tend to overestimate the
actual benefits of a more equal landings pattern. Thus, the benefits from closures
may be even smaller than our estimates.
A more realistic policy approach may be to encourage localized management
programs that incorporate closed seasons. As Acheson (1972, 1975) has shown,
the lobster industry historically had well-defined local regions with de facto local
control of fishing effort. Acheson's 'Mobster fiefs" have declined in importance as
fishing effort increased and as larger boats increased the fishing range of lobster-
men. However, there remain some areas, particularly in central and eastern
Maine, where local territories still exist for groups of fishermen. For example, the
lobstermen of Monhegan Island have been able to maintain local control, in part,
because their ''territory" is more geographically isolated. In fact, Monhegan Is-
land has a legislatively mandated season of January to June, which has two ad-
vantages: prices are highest in this period, and the winter weather makes intrusion
into their territory much more difficult. Wilson (1977) showed that this combina-
tion of controls has generated economic rents for the lobstermen of Monhegan.
The lobstermen of Swan's Island have recently agreed to a local trap limit pro-
gram, which may indicate that new steps at expanded local control are feasible
today.
The benefits of localized closures to the local area can be determined from the
price differential between the open and closed months. To evaluate the impact of
such localized closures upon the entire industry, the marginal revenue in the open
months and closed months is necessary. Table 5 presents these prices and mar-
ginal revenues, based upon average landings in 1986-1988. For example, moving
one pound of lobster from September to March will increase the price of that
pound of lobster by $1.88 and would increase the total revenue to the industry
(combined U.S. and Canada) by $3.70. To illustrate a program of local closure,
consider a hypothetical closure that removes 10,000 pounds from each month of
July to December and increases landings by 10,000 pounds in each month, Jan-
uary through June. This would increase total revenues to the closed area by about
$60,100 and would increase total revenues to the industry by about $118,400. The
gain per pound in the closed region equals the price differential between the
seasons; the entire industry gains by the difference in marginal revenue.
It might be argued that seasonal closures are, in fact, effort reductions. With
a four month closure, each trap would have its potential fishing time reduced from
twelve months to eight months. But few traps are currently fished for more than
a few months, because few lobsters remain to be caught after the intense fishing116 Cheng and Townsend
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of July to November. Closures will largely move the period of fishing. Seasonal
closures may have a secondary effect that depresses fishing effort somewhat, at
least in the short run. The large summer/fall landings are caught by a fleet that
includes a large number of part-time fishermen. These part-timers lack the skill
and equipment to fish in colder months and deeper waters. Some are students or
workers with seasonal jobs; others may fish in the late afternoon. Consequently,
closures in the summer and early fall will substantially reduce their income. Some
of these part-timers are likely to find that they can no longer cover the opportunity
costs of their fixed inputs. As a result, the income of full-time fishermen will
increase. In an open access fishery, this would attract more fishermen in the long
run. But in this fishery, reductions in the numbers of part-timers may permit
re-establishment of the historical local control mechanisms. Thus, seasonal clo-
sures may be part of a broader strategy of co-operative management.
Summary
The conclusions here are not unexpected. The concentration of landings in the
late summer is undesirable if the industry is to maximize its revenues. Potential
revenue could increase as much as 18 percent if landings were distributed opti-
mally. Moreover, the problem has been exacerbated by the increases in effort,
which have caused U.S. total revenues to decrease 6 percent because of the
resulting increased concentration in landings that has occurred since the late
1960s.
This analysis may be conservative in its assessment of the effect of less con-
centrated supply upon gross revenues. Less concentrated supply would permit
more lobsters to be sold in markets that require a year-round supply. For exam-
ple, wholesalers often state that a steady flow is crucial to developing markets in
"white tablecloth" restaurants, because lobster is a "top of the menu" item that
must be available if it is listed on the menu. Because prices are generally higher
in the year-round markets, selling more lobsters into these markets would beLobster Seasonal Closures 117
expected to increase total revenues. The present analysis does not consider this
potentially beneficial effect on development of new markets for lobster.
Like most management issues in this industry, the solution to seasonal con-
centrations is probably linked to effort reduction. The intuitively simple strategy
of using seasonal closures to reverse the seasonal concentration does not seem
feasible, because short closures have no real impact. Closures for four or five
months may have some modest effect upon total revenues, but extended closures
probably face political obstacles analogous to those that block adoption of limited
entry or trap limits. Perhaps the only feasible strategy is to enable and to encour-
age local areas to consider closures of several months duration. Such local clo-
sures may increase gross revenues in the local area very significantly and would
also have a small positive impact upon gross revenues for the rest of the industry.
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